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Abstract
Using German establishment data, we provide evidence for 
selection of larger, more productive producers into offshor-
ing. However, the selection is not sharp, and offshoring and 
nonoffshoring producers coexist over a wide range of the 
revenue distribution. To explain this overlap, we set up a 
model of offshoring, in which we decouple offshoring sta-
tus from revenues through heterogeneity in two technology 
parameters. In an empirical analysis, we employ German 
establishment data to estimate key parameters of the model 
and show that disregarding the overlap has large quantita-
tive effects. It lowers the estimated gains from offshoring 
by almost 50% and, at the same time, exaggerates the role 
of the extensive margin for explaining the evolution of 
German offshoring since the 1990s.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Offshoring and its welfare effects have played a prominent role in academic research and the public 
debate since the fall of the iron curtain. In recent years, attention in the literature has shifted towards 
understanding the specific nature of firms that choose to offshore. Relying on models of heteroge-
neous firms, trade economists have pointed out that similar to exporters, offshoring firms are larger, 
more productive, and make higher profits than their nonoffshoring competitors (see Antràs, Garicano, 
& Rossi‐Hansberg, 2006; Antràs & Helpman, 2004; Egger, Kreickemeier, & Wrona, 2015). Although, 
grosso modo, this pattern is consistent with the data (cf. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, & Schott, 2012; 
Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, & Xiang, 2014; Moser, Urban, & Weder di Mauro, 2015), existing 
theoretical work misses the empirical fact that offshoring and nonoffshoring producers coexist over a 
wide range of the productivity distribution, as put forward by Tomiura (2007) and Antràs and Yeaple 
(2014) for Japanese and Spanish firms, respectively.
To explain this fact and to shed light on how it changes the conclusions we draw when it comes to 
the consequences of offshoring are the aim of this paper. For this purpose, we first reestablish two im-
portant patterns of offshoring from previous research using German establishment data: Selection, be-
cause offshoring is more common among producers from higher quantiles of the revenue distribution; 
Overlap, since there is coexistence of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers in the various quantiles 
of the revenue distribution. Based on empirical findings regarding important determinants of offshor-
ing, we then construct a theoretical model that captures selection and overlap and use this model for a 
structural estimation of parameters, using German establishment data. With the parameter estimates 
at hand, we then study the nature and extent of the bias in the quantitative welfare effects of offshoring 
that originates from disregarding the overlap in the data and show how ignoring the overlap affects the 
relative importance of extensive and intensive margins for explaining observed changes in offshoring.
To construct our dataset, we combine information from three different sources. The first one is the 
Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), which along with other plant‐
level data provides information on offshoring activities of German producers for the years 1999, 2001, 
and 2003. As a second source of data input, we rely on the Employment Survey of the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) and the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (BAuA), which covers data on workers and, in particular, the activities they conduct in their 
workplace. We use the 2006 survey information to construct a measure of task content (the number of 
tasks and the share of tasks that are offshorable) for more than 300 occupations and employ the Linked 
Employer–Employee Database from the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB) to aggregate the 
task content at the occupation level to the plant level to merge workplace information from the BIBB/
BAuA survey with employer information from the Establishment Panel. This gives a unique dataset 
for studying offshoring in the context of task production, and we use this dataset to show descriptive 
evidence on offshoring behavior and to identify key factors governing the offshoring decision of 
German producers.
Based on the empirical evidence, we set up a two‐country model of offshoring, with labor being the 
only factor of production. The two countries differ in their levels of development and since offshoring 
is low‐cost seeking, it is one directional and leads to production shifting from the more developed 
source country to the less developed host country. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we model 
production as the assembly of tasks, with producers differing in the number of tasks performed in the 
production process. The number of tasks is directly linked to firm productivity, reflecting the idea that 
the usage of more tasks allows for a stronger division of labor in the production of goods. Hence, firm 
heterogeneity materializes because of differences in the task range—the number of tasks conducted 
divided by the total number of tasks available. Because of fixed costs and a positive link between 
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task range and revenues, our model features selection into offshoring, similar to Antràs and Helpman 
(2004). To capture the overlap in the data, we add a second source of heterogeneity and assume, in 
line with German establishment data, that producers also differ in the share of tasks that can be off-
shored to the low‐cost host country.1  In the tradition of theoretical work building on the Melitz (2003) 
framework, we model firm heterogeneity as the outcome of a lottery, but acknowledge that firms draw 
two technology parameters: the task range and the share of offshorable tasks. The interaction of these 
two technology parameters determines the pattern of offshoring in our model.2  The model predicts 
that establishments conducting more tasks and establishments using a larger share of offshorable tasks 
experience a higher probability to start offshoring, which finds strong support in our data.
In the theory section, we use this model to analyze how changes in variable and fixed offshoring 
costs affect offshoring and welfare in the source country. A decline in the variable cost of offshoring 
lowers the price of foreign workers. This makes offshoring attractive for a wider range of producers 
and increases the volume of tasks imported by incumbent offshoring firms—because the lower cost of 
foreign production makes them more competitive and because they substitute domestically produced 
tasks for imported ones. Both effects stimulate labor demand in the host country and lead to a rise in 
foreign wages. However, the increase in foreign wages is of second order and dominated by the initial 
drop in variable offshoring costs, so that the effective cost of employing foreign workers decreases. 
This reflects an appreciation of domestic relative to foreign labor and thus an improvement of the 
(double) factorial terms of trade for the source country of offshoring with positive welfare implica-
tions (cf. Ghironi & Melitz, 2005).3  Things are different if the fixed cost of offshoring falls. Whereas 
this makes offshoring attractive for new producers, the higher foreign labor demand and the resulting 
increase in host country wages prompt incumbent offshoring producers to reduce the volume of im-
ported tasks. The deterioration of the (double) factorial terms of trade counteracts the direct welfare 
gain from a lower offshoring fixed cost and this leads to the somewhat counterintuitive result that 
lifting a technology barrier can actually lower welfare of the source country of offshoring.4 
In the empirical analysis, we employ the German establishment data to estimate key parameters of 
our theoretical model, using method of moments. Thereby, we consider two model variants: a flexible 
one, in which we allow for overlap; and a restrictive one, in which we rule out overlap by assumption. 
We find that the model with overlap provides a better fit with the data and show that disregarding 
the overlap significantly lowers the estimated cost saving from offshoring. This is intuitive, because 
the model without overlap presumes that all producers engaged in offshoring have high productivity 
and these are producers that require a comparably low cost saving to find offshoring attractive. The 
discrepancy regarding the estimated cost savings from offshoring generates quantitatively sizable dif-
ferences in the welfare effects attributed to offshoring by the two models. The model with overlap 
associates the observed share of offshoring producers with an increase in German GDP per capita of 
20.71%. The welfare gain attributed to offshoring falls to 10.93% and is therefore almost 50% lower 
in the model without overlap.
We finally use our model to decompose the observed increase of German offshoring openness 
vis‐á‐vis non‐EMU countries from 7.01% in 1990 to 16.11% in 2013 into its intensive margin— 
capturing changes in the offshoring activity of incumbent offshoring producers; and its extensive 
margin—capturing changes in the mass of offshoring producers.5  We show that both margins contrib-
uted significantly to the observed increase of German offshoring, with the intensive margin explaining 
about 38.23% of this increase. Disregarding the overlap, the model would attribute only 9.33% of the 
observed increase in German offshoring openness to the intensive margin and therefore considerably 
exaggerate the role played by the extensive margin. The model with (without) overlap suggests, more-
over, that the increase in offshoring openness between 1990 and 2013 has entailed a welfare gain of 
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8.93% (7.86%), which explains almost one quarter of the overall increase in German GDP per capita 
over this period.
Shedding light on the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring firms, our analysis is closely related 
to Antràs, Fort, and Tintelnot (2017), who study the sourcing of firms in a multi‐country model. They 
identify under which conditions importing exhibits complementarities across source markets so that 
larger firms end up importing from more countries. To reconcile the predictions of their model with 
the empirical observation that low‐productivity firms do not import from strict subsets of source mar-
kets of high productivity firms, Antràs et al. (2017) allow firms to differ in two technology parameters, 
namely their core productivity and their fixed costs of market access. Whereas considering differences 
of productivity and fixed costs of market access as the two sources of heterogeneity would not change 
key predictions of our theoretical model, our dataset does not provide information on these two vari-
ables. For reasons of data availability, we therefore consider heterogeneity in two alternative technol-
ogy parameters: the task range and the share of tasks that can be offshored.6  As a further difference to 
Antràs et al. (2017), we account for dependencies in the distributions of technology parameters, and 
analyze to what extent such dependencies are important for describing the overlap in the data. Finally, 
we investigate how accounting for overlap changes the relative importance of the extensive and the 
intensive margins for explaining observed changes in offshoring—similar to Armenter and Koren’s 
(2015) analysis in the context of exporting—and provide a detailed welfare analysis.7 
By studying the effects of offshoring on source country welfare, our model contributes to a large 
body of literature that includes prominent contributions by Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg (2008), 
Rodriguez‐Clare (2010), and more recently Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2015). Similar to 
Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg (2008), we associate offshoring with a relocation of task production 
to a low‐cost country. However, focussing on the decision of heterogeneous firms to offshore while 
keeping the share of offshorable tasks constant, we follow Egger et al. (2015) and emphasize a specific 
adjustment channel, whose quantitative importance has been put forward by recent empirical evidence 
(cf. Bergin, Feenstra, & Hanson, 2011). Furthermore, since disregarding the overlap in the data leads 
to a downward bias in the welfare effects attributed to offshoring, our analysis points to a so far un-
explored argument of why welfare effects of new‐generation quantitative trade models are sometimes 
unrealistically small (cf. Caliendo & Parro, 2015; Costinot & Rodriguez‐Clare, 2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our dataset, report 
descriptives, illustrate the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers for Germany, and iden-
tify important factors explaining the offshoring decision. In Section 3, we set up a theoretical model 
that captures key features of the data, analyze the main adjustment margins, and study the welfare 
effects of offshoring in the presence of overlap. In Section 4 we employ our data to estimate key model 
parameters in a structural approach, discuss the goodness of fit of our model, quantify the welfare 
effects, and show to what extent accounting for the observed overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring 
firms affects our results. We also apply our quantitative trade model to decompose the observed in-
crease in German offshoring openness between 1990 and 2013 into its extensive and intensive margin 
and shed light on the welfare gains attributable to the increase in offshoring over this period. The last 
section concludes with a summary of the most important results.
2 |  DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVES
We use data from three different sources. Information on production plants comes from the 
Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in Nuremberg.8  This database 
provides detailed establishment data on sales, input expenditures, the number of employees, etc. from 
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employer surveys at an annual basis since 1993. Information on the offshoring activity of German 
producers is available in this dataset for 1999, 2001, and 2003, and hence we restrict our empirical 
analysis to these three years. Following Moser et al. (2015), we associate offshoring with the purchase 
of intermediates or other inputs from abroad in the previous business year. To capture the idea that 
offshoring is low‐cost seeking, we restrict its definition to intermediate goods imports from non‐EMU 
members.9 
As a second data source, we use the BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey, which provides detailed 
information on the tasks performed and the occupations held by respondents for a representative 
sample of German employees with a working time of more than 10 hours per week (see Rohrbach‐
Schmidt, 2009, for a detailed description). Interviews have been conducted six times since 1979. 
Since the definition of tasks has changed over time and since using consistent task measures for more 
than a single year would result in a significant loss of data (cf. Becker & Muendler, 2015), we only 
consider the 2006 survey for our analysis. This survey covers 20,000 employees and allows us to dis-
tinguish 341 different occupations, according to the classification of the Federal Employment Agency 
(KldB, 1988), as well as 30 different tasks, which are listed in the Online Appendix (for access, see 
Supporting Information at the end of the paper). Interviewees can answer the question on whether 
they perform a certain task either with often/sometimes/never or with yes/no. We give answers yes and 
often a weight of one, the answer sometimes a weight of 0.5 and answers never or no a weight of zero, 
aggregate the thus weighted tasks for each interviewee, average over all individuals in an occupation, 
and divide the result by the total number of tasks reported by the BIBB/BAuA survey.10  Following this 
procedure, we can assign a task range between 0 and 1 to 303 occupations in our dataset. Following 
Spitz‐Oener (2006) and Becker, Ekholm, and Muendler (2013), we furthermore distinguish routine or 
nonroutine tasks and tasks requiring or not requiring face‐to‐face contact, classify routine tasks that 
do not need face‐to‐face communication as offshorable, as suggested by Levy and Murnane (2004) 
and Blinder (2006), and compute the share of offshorable tasks for each of the 303 occupations, for 
which we have determined the task range. The Online Appendix (see Supporting Information) gives 
an overview of which tasks are classified offshorable.11 
To aggregate the task information from occupations to the firm level, we proceed in two steps. In 
a first step, we assign the task range and the share of offshorable tasks at the occupation level from 
BIBB/BAuA to the Establishment Panel. For this purpose, we make use of the Linked Employer–
Employee (LIAB) database of the Institute for Employment Research, which provides record linkages 
for matching employees registered with the German social security system to the IAB Establishment 
Panel. The employee data contains the information on the occupation of workers, which we use for 
linking task information form BIBB/BAuA to firms in the Establishment Panel at the worker level. In 
a second step, we then compute the simple average of the two task variables (the task range and the 
share of offshorable tasks) across all workers within an establishment. Unfortunately, we lose some 
occupations through the matching procedure, because confidentiality rules of the IAB require that 
outside data matched to LIAB relies on at least three individual observations. Overall, we can generate 
task information for 268 occupations in the IAB Establishment Panel. Dropping establishments for 
which we lack task and/or other relevant plant‐level information, we end up with a total number of 
15,165 establishments and 24,342 establishment observations.
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptives of our dataset. The share of offshoring plants is with a 
value of 21.45% higher than the share of offshoring firms reported by Moser et al. (2015). The reason 
for this difference is that Moser et al. (2015) define offshoring by a qualitative increase of a firm’s 
share of foreign intermediates in two consecutive periods with offshoring information, which is a 
more restrictive definition of offshoring than the one we use in our cross‐section. The second row tells 
us that there is a lot of variation in the task range of German producers. Since we can only observe 
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tasks conducted at home, the maximum task range of offshoring producers may be higher than indi-
cated by Table 1. German producers also differ significantly in their share of offshorable tasks, and 
in some plants more than 60% of the tasks are vulnerable to offshoring.12  Plants in our sample also 
feature large differences in the size of workforce as well as revenues and revenues per workers, which 
is the reason, why we report them in logs.
To illustrate the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers, we can rank the establish-
ments in our dataset by their revenues and define decile intervals as a 10% fraction of the largest 
producers with revenues up to a decile position. This gives for the first decile interval the 10% fraction 
of producers with the lowest revenues in the dataset; for the second decile interval the 10% fraction of 
producers with revenues larger than the first decile and lower than or equal to the second decile; and 
so on. Averaging the share of offshoring producers over the respective decile intervals gives the pro-
file in Figure 1, where black dots refer to the full sample of establishments from all sectors, whereas 
grey diamonds refer to the subsample of manufacturing producers. Figure 1 makes a strong case for 
selection, because the share of offshoring producers is larger in intervals reflecting higher revenues. 
However, the selection is not sharp, because offshoring and nonoffshoring producers coexist in all 
decile intervals. This highlights that overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers in the revenue 
distribution is an important feature of the German establishment data.
The establishment data can also be used to identify key determinants of offshoring. For this pur-
pose, we regress our binary offshoring variable on the task range, the share of offshorable tasks, other 
plant‐level controls, and industry as well as region dummies, using a probit estimator. This shows the 
correlation of offshoring with key observables in our dataset, with the results of the analysis reported 
in Table 2.
From the results in Table 2, we can conclude that both the task range as well as the share of 
offshorable tasks are important determinants of offshoring. This result holds in the parsimonious 
specification of model (1), in which we only consider these two explanatory variables as well as in 
specifications in which we add log revenues and log revenues per worker as well as industry and re-
gion dummies as further controls: models (2) to (5). In model (6), we zoom in on the extensive margin 
of offshoring. For this purpose, restrict the sample of producers to those that are at least observed in 
two years and do not offshore in their initial year of observation. We then construct a dummy variable 
for switchers, which has a value of 1 if a firm starts to offshore in the second or third year of obser-
vation and a value of 0, otherwise. Evaluating the mean of the dummy variable shows that 11.35% of 
the 5,196 producers in this refined sample switch into offshoring. We then regress the binary variable 
for switchers on the determinants of offshoring in model (5) and find that the main insights regarding 
T A B L E  1  Descriptive statistics
Mean Median STD. Min. Max.
Offshoring 0.215 0.005 0.411 0.000 1.000
Task range 0.271 0.272 0.039 0.092 0.407
Share of offshorable tasks 0.303 0.296 0.061 0.104 0.605
Log workforce size 3.003 2.890 1.888 0 10.786
Log revenues 14.717 14.509 2.173 7.601 23.148
Log revenues/worker 11.714 11.618 0.956 4.729 20.516
Note: Descriptives are computed based on 24,342 establishment observations over the years 1999, 2001, 2003. Workforce only covers  
regular employees and excludes apprentices, trainees, leased laborers, etc. 
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the role of task range and the share of offshorable tasks for the probability of offshoring remain valid, 
when considering the extensive margin only.13 
To assess the quantitative importance of the estimates, we can look at marginal effects. For the 
preferred specification in model (5), we find that evaluated at its mean, an increase in the task range 
by one standard deviation (or 3.91 percentage points) increases the probability to offshore by 2.25 
percentage points (10.45% of its mean), whereas an increase in the share of offshorable tasks by one 
standard deviation (or 6.11 percentage points) increases the probability to offshore by 1.10 percentage 
points (5.10% of its mean). These effects are sizable even in comparison with the marginal effect of 
an increase in revenues. Increasing the mean of log revenues by one standard deviation (or 14.77%) 
increases the probability to offshore by 12.20 percentage points (56.73% of its mean).
In the next section, we use the insights from above as guidance for constructing a theoretical model 
that captures two important features of the German establishment: selection and overlap. Relying 
on a Melitz‐type model in which the existence of fixed costs leads to selection of more productive 
producers with higher revenues into offshoring, we consider exogenous differences in task range as 
the major source of heterogeneity generating differences in productivities. To capture the overlap 
of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers outlined in Figure 1, we add differences in the share of 
offshorable tasks as a second source of heterogeneity. As shown below, it is the interaction of these 
two factors of heterogeneity that explains offshoring in our model and, in line with the results from 
the probit regressions, the model predicts that producers with a larger task range as well as producers 
using a larger share of offshorable tasks have a higher probability to offshore.
3 |  A MODEL OF OFFSHORING AND FIRM OVERLAP
3.1 | Basic assumptions and intermediate results
We consider a static (one‐period) world with two economies. Consumers in both countries have con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences over a continuum of differentiated and freely trad-
able goods x(ω). The representative consumer’s utility is given by U =
[∫
휔∈Ω
x(휔)(휎−1)∕휎d휔
]휎∕(휎−1), 
F I G U R E  1  Share of offshoring producers. Note: The figure covers 24,342 German establishment observations 
for the years 1999, 2001, and 2003 from all size categories. •, refer to the full sample of producers; ⧫, refer 
to manufacturing producers only. Source: IAB Establishment Panel. Descriptive statistics are based on own 
computations
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where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties ω and Ω is the set of avail-
able consumer goods. Maximizing U subject to the representative consumer’s budget constraint 
I = ∫
휔∈Ω
p(휔)x(휔) gives isoelastic demand for variety ω: 
where I is aggregate income, p(ω) is the price of good ω, and P =
[∫
휔∈Ω
p(휔)1−휎d휔
]1∕(1−휎) is a CES price 
index.
The two economies differ in their level of development and are populated by L and L∗ units of 
labor, respectively, where an asterisk refers to the economy with the lower level of development. 
This is the host country of offshoring, whereas the more advanced economy is the source country of 
offshoring. Similar to Egger et al. (2015), we assume that the host country lacks the technology to op-
erate its own firms. This implies that all (industrial) producers are headquartered in the source country 
and it makes the host country a labor reservoir that is inactive in the absence of offshoring.14  Firms 
perform different tasks, which are combined in a Cobb–Douglas technology to produce output y(ω): 
(1)x(휔)= I
P
[
p(휔)
P
]−휎
,
T A B L E  2  Offshoring in the cross‐section of firms
Probit estimation
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Task range 2.526*** 2.258*** 2.474*** 2.443*** 2.437*** 3.123** 
(0.238) (0.261) (0.290) (0.313) (0.314) (0.761)
Share of offshorable 
tasks
4.352*** 1.697*** 1.961*** 0.748** 0.761** 1.475* 
(0.156) (0.210) (0.218) (0.246) (0.247) (0.593)
Log revenues 0.240*** 0.238*** 0.195*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Log revenues per 
worker
0.007 −0.028
(0.013) (0.035)
Constant −2.818*** −2.395*** −1.966*** −5.400*** −5.466*** −5.551*** 
(0.094) (0.127) (0.141) (0.178) (0.213) (0.578)
Dummies
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,342 24,342 24,342 24,342 24,342 5,196
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.109 0.149 0.237 0.237 0.141
Log Likelihood −12,271.7 −11,274.2 −10,773.9 −9,650.2 −9,650.0 −1,579.2
Log Likelihood (con-
stant only)
−12,653.9 −12,653.9 −12,653.9 −12,653.9 −12,653.9 −1,838.7
Note: The dependent variable in models 1–5 is the offshoring dummy from Table 1. The dependent variable in model 6 is a binary 
variable for switchers in a subset of establishments that are observed in at least two years and do not offshore initially. Robust stand-
ard errors in parentheses: 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. 
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where y(ω, i) denotes the output of task i and z(ω) is the task range of firm ω, that is, the number of 
tasks performed divided by the total number of tasks available. The technology in Equation 2 captures 
in a simple way the gains from labor division, as performing more tasks increases a firm’s productivity. 
Assuming that task output equals labor input, the firm’s total variable production costs are given by 
Cv(휔) = ∫ z(휔)
0
휁(i)y(휔, i)di, where ζ(i) is the effective labor cost of task i, which is equal to the domestic 
wage w if a task is performed at home and equal to the foreign wage w∗ multiplied by an iceberg trade cost 
parameter τ > 1 if the task is performed abroad.
Profit maximization is a three‐stage problem. At stage one, (risk‐neutral) firms decide on market 
entry, which involves the investment of fe units of labor. The investment allows firms to participate 
in a lottery, in which they draw task range z from a common distribution. At stage two, firms decide 
upon offshoring. This requires the investment of f units of labor and allows them to draw technology 
parameter s in a second lottery. After the investment, firms can put the share s of their tasks offshore.15  
At stage three, firms hire workers, produce, and sell their output in a monopolistically competitive 
market, facing consumer demand in Equation 1. Being a monopolist in their own market, firms con-
sider x(ω) = y(ω) and thus the impact of their employment decision on their own price. At the same 
time, firms are atomistic in the aggregate, and hence take income I and price index P as given. We 
solve the three‐stage problem by backward induction.
At stage three firms make the employment decision for each task at home and abroad. Owing to the 
underlying Cobb–Douglas technology in Equation 2, profit maximization establishes the result that 
expenditures are the same for all tasks. The marginal production cost of firm ω is therefore given by 
where 휅≡ 휏w∗∕w denotes effective labor costs in the host relative to the source country of offshoring. 
Since offshoring has fixed costs, κ < 1 must hold in order to make it attractive for firms to shift task pro-
duction abroad, and we can associate 𝜅−s(𝜔) > 1 with the marginal cost saving effect of offshoring. Owing 
to an isoelastic demand function, profit maximization at stage three further establishes the well‐known 
result that firms set their prices as a constant markup over their marginal costs: p(ω) = c(ω)σ/(σ−1). In 
view of Equation 1, firm‐level revenues, r(ω) = p(ω)y(ω) are then given by r(휔) = I[p(휔)∕P]1−휎, and 
relative revenues of two firms can be expressed as a decreasing function of their marginal cost differential: 
In view of Equation 4, we can index revenues r by marginal costs c instead of ω from now on, in the un-
derstanding that marginal production costs are firm specific.16 
At stage two firms make their offshoring decision. Offshoring requires the investment of f > 0 
units of labor, which allows firms to participate in a lottery, in which they draw the share of off-
shorable tasks s. We assume that the distribution of s depends on the realization of z. To be more 
specific, a firm’s probability to have at least some offshorable tasks is a positive function of the 
task range, and in the interest of tractability we assume Prz(s > 0) ≡ 𝜈0 + 𝜈1z, with 휈0, 휈1 ≥ 0 and 
(2)y(휔)= z(휔)
1−z(휔)
exp
[
1
z(휔) ∫
z(휔)
0
ln y(휔, i)di
]
,
(3)c(휔)=
{
[1−z(휔)]w if all tasks are produced at home
[1−z(휔)]w휅s(휔) if share s(휔) of tasks is produced offshore
,
(4)r(휔1)
r(휔2)
=
[
c(휔1)
c(휔2)
]1−휎
.
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휈 ≡ 휈0 + 휈1 ∈ (0, 1]. We associate parameter 휈0 with a common offshorability factor and a positive 
value of 휈0 implies that even firms with the lowest possible task range have a positive probability that 
some of their tasks are offshorable. Parameter 휈1 captures a firm‐specific offshorability factor with a 
positive value reflecting that firms with larger task range have a higher probability that some of their 
tasks are offshorable. Finally, we use the term “combined offshorability factor” to refer to 휈= 휈0+휈1. 
For firms with some offshorable tasks, the share of tasks that can be put offshore, s, is uniformly 
distributed over the interval (0, 1]. Hence, for a firm with task range z, the ex ante expected value of s 
is given by 피z[s] = (휈0 + 휈1z)∕2. The expected relative revenue gain from offshoring depends on the 
cost saving under all possible realizations of s. For 𝜈1>0, it is larger for firms with a better z draw: 
피z
[
𝜅s(1−𝜎)
]
= Prz(s > 0) ∫ 10 𝜅s(1−𝜎)ds, with dPrz(s > 0)∕dz > 0. In absolute terms, there is a second 
advantage that renders offshoring more attractive for firms with a better z draw. They make higher 
revenues at any possible realization of s, according to Equations 3 and 4, and hence can more easily 
cover the fixed cost of offshoring.
Being risk‐neutral, firms will make the offshoring investment only if its expected return is suffi-
ciently high, and since the expected return is higher ceteris paribus for firms that have drawn a larger 
value of z in the lottery, our model establishes for a sufficiently high fixed cost parameter f selection 
of high‐productive firms into offshoring. For the moment, we simply assume selection, whereas in 
Section 3.3 we characterize the parameter domain that supports selection in our model. Accounting 
for Equations 3 and 4, the expected profit gain from offshoring of a firm with task range z can be 
expressed as Prz(s > 0)(1−z)1−𝜎r(w)[ ∫ 10 𝜅s(1−𝜎)ds−1]∕𝜎− fw, where r(w) is the revenue of the least 
productive firm with z = 0 and c = w, which is a firm that does not offshore (see below). The marginal 
offshoring firm with task range z̄, which is the firm that is indifferent between making and not making 
investment f, is therefore characterized by the following condition 
where c̄ ≡ (1− z̄)w and 휈 = 휈0 + 휈1 is the combined offshorability factor (see above).
At stage one, firms decide on firm entry. To enter the source country, they must make an initial 
investment of fe > 0 units of labor. This investment gives them a single draw of task range z from a 
common distribution function. For tractability reasons, we assume that z is Pareto distributed over the 
unit interval with a probability density function gz(z) = k(1−z)k−1, k > 0. We consider a static model 
and, following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), abstract from fixed costs of production, so that all firms 
participating in the technology lottery start production, irrespective of their z draw. We do not allow 
for selection into production, because our dataset covers many small producers, which employ only 
few domestic workers. Free entry requires that firms make zero profits in expectation, and hence that 
aggregate operating profits, that is, total revenues R divided by σ, are equal to economy‐wide expen-
ditures for fixed costs, Mc̄kf + Mfe, where M is the mass of firms producing distinct varieties ω. The 
solution to the firms’ problem at stage one gives the mass of firms entering the z‐lottery, which is 
determined in general equilibrium and discussed in Section 3.3. To solve for the general equilibrium 
outcome, we first need to understand how the distributions of the two technology parameters z and s 
determine the distribution of marginal costs (and thus revenues) in our setting.
3.2 | The distribution of marginal costs
Even though our model features two forms of firm heterogeneity, we can conclude from Equation 3 
that their combined effect on firm‐level performance measures is captured by a single variable: the 
(5)𝜎fw=
(
𝜈−𝜈1
c̄
w
)(
c̄
w
)1−𝜎
r(w)
[
𝜅1−𝜎−1
(1−𝜎) ln 𝜅
−1
]
.
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marginal cost of production. This implies that we can learn about the distribution of firms in their 
various performance measures, when we understand how the distributions of the two technology 
parameters z and s map into the distribution of marginal costs c. The marginal cost of nonoffshoring 
firms is given by c = (1−z)w, according to Equation 3. Nonoffshoring firms are either low‐productiv-
ity producers with task range z ≤ z̄ or they are high productivity producers with task range z ≥ z̄ and 
no offshorable task. Owing to the inverse link between c and z, there is no difference between ranking 
nonoffshoring firms by their task range or the marginal costs—with the ordering of firms flipped—
and for these firms we can therefore infer the distribution of marginal costs c from the distribution of 
task range z and the insights that a z‐specific share of firms, 1−Prz(s > 0), has not a single offshorable 
task.
Things are more complicated for offshoring firms, which are high‐productivity firms with task 
range of z ≥ z̄, whose production process includes at least some offshorable tasks. The marginal cost 
of an offshoring firm is given by c = (1−z)w휅s, according to Equation 3, and thus the product of two 
random variables. Therefore, the ranking of c cannot be inferred from the ranking of z in this case. 
Characterizing the distribution of marginal costs in the population of offshoring firms becomes even 
more sophisticated if 𝜈1 > 0, because in this case the distributions of z and s are not independent. In 
the Online Appendix (see Supporting Information at end of paper), we show how we can link the 
distributions of z and s to compute the probability density function (pdf) of normalized marginal 
production costs c/w: 
The probability density function of c/w is illustrated for two different sets of parameters in Figure 2.
(6)
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As we can see from Equation 6 and Figure 2 the pdf of (normalized) marginal costs, gc( cw ), has support on the unit interval and features a discontinuity at c̄∕w. This is because for firms with task 
range z ≥ z̄ investment into offshoring is attractive, and a subset of these firms detects to have at least 
some offshorable tasks and thus starts offshoring. Since offshoring firms experience a marginal cost 
saving and are thus shifted to a lower c/w and since the fraction of firms that is affected by this cost 
saving is discrete for any z > 0, selection into offshoring generates a discontinuity of the pdf at c̄∕w in 
Figure 2. The kink of the pdf function at 𝜅c̄∕w is also rooted in the selection of high‐productivity firms 
into offshoring. More specifically, since firms with z < z̄ refuse to make the fixed cost investment for 
learning about the offshorability of their tasks, none of these firms is shifted towards lower marginal 
costs. This imposes a binding (selection) constraint on the number of firms that can be located in 
marginal cost interval 
[
𝜅 c̄
w
,
c̄
w
]
. For (normalized) marginal costs c∕w < 𝜅c̄∕w the selection constraint 
is not binding, because the maximum possible cost saving from offshoring when shifting all tasks 
abroad is given by κ, and hence a firm with task range z < z̄ could not be shifted to a (normalized) 
marginal cost lower than 𝜅c̄∕w even if it would make the investment into offshoring despite an ex-
pected profit loss.
3.3 | The general equilibrium
To solve for the general equilibrium, we choose source country labor as numéraire and set w = 1. As 
shown in the Online Appendix, using Equation 6, we can express economy‐wide revenues as follows: 
where r(1) is the revenue of the least productive producer if w = 1 and k > 2(σ−1) is assumed to ensure a 
finite positive value of both the mean and the variance of revenues (cf. Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004). 
As outlined above, free entry establishes R = M𝜎
(
fe + c̄
kf
)
. Together with Equations 5 and 7, this gives 
a relationship between the marginal cost of the offshoring firm that is indifferent between making and 
not making investment f, c̄, and the effective wage differential between the host and the source country of 
offshoring, κ, which we call “offshoring indifference condition” (OC): 
As formally shown in the Online Appendix, Γ1( ⋅ ) = 0 establishes a negative link between c̄ and κ. The 
larger the relative effective labor costs in the host country are, the smaller is the cost saving effect of off-
shoring and the more productive the marginal firm that makes investment f must be in order to avoid in 
expectation losses from this investment. Intuitively, if the cost saving from offshoring vanishes owing to 
κ = 1, all firms prefer domestic production, resulting in c̄ = 0. In contrast, c̄ reaches a maximum at low 
levels of κ.
A second link between c̄ and κ can be determined, when noting from above that free entry into the 
technology lottery at stage one implies that all (disposable) income accrues to workers, I = L + w∗L∗. 
Since global income is equal to total consumption expenditures, we have R = L + w∗L∗. Furthermore, 
constant markup pricing establishes the well‐known result that variable production costs are a con-
stant fraction (σ−1)/σ of a firm’s revenues, with part of these costs accruing to imported tasks. As 
formally shown in the Online Appendix, the wage bill for workers in the host country of offshoring 
can thus be expressed as a function of aggregate revenues according to 
(7)R=Mr(1)
[
k
k−𝜎+1
+ c̄k−𝜎+1
(
k𝜈
k−𝜎+1
−
k𝜈1c̄
k−𝜎+2
)(
𝜅1−𝜎−1
(1−𝜎) ln 𝜅
−1
)]
,
(8)Γ1 (c̄, 𝜅)≡ c̄
𝜎−1
𝜈−𝜈1c̄
k
k−𝜎+1
+
{
c̄k
𝜈−𝜈1c̄
[
(𝜎−1)𝜈
k−𝜎+1
−
(𝜎−2)𝜈1c̄
k−𝜎+2
]
−
fe
f
}[
𝜅1−𝜎−1
(1−𝜎) ln 𝜅
−1
]
=0.
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In combination with R = L + w∗L∗ this establishes a second implicit link between the two endogenous 
variables κ and c̄, which reflects adjustments in the effective wage differential in response to changes in the 
attractiveness of offshoring that are enforced by labor market clearing in the two economies: 
We refer to this implicit relationship by the term “labor market constraint” (LC) and formally show in the 
Online Appendix that Γ2( ⋅ ) = 0 establishes a positive link between κ and c̄. The larger is c̄, the more firms 
are engaged in offshoring and the larger is ceteris paribus the demand for foreign workers. This drives up 
foreign wages and increases κ. If c̄ falls to zero, there is no offshoring and, lacking access to occupations 
outside the production sector, wages in the host country and thus also κ fall to zero. In contrast, κ reaches 
a maximum at a high level of c̄.
The equilibrium values of c̄ and κ are jointly determined by the offshoring indifference condition 
and the labor market constraint. Thereby, our model features a unique interior equilibrium if offshor-
ing cost parameters τ and f are sufficiently high.17  The impact of changes in the two offshoring cost 
parameters is illustrated in Figure 3. A higher variable offshoring cost parameter τ implies for a given 
volume of offshoring that more foreign workers must be employed in order to provide the required 
amount of tasks for production in the source country. Therefore, the effective cost for employing 
foreign relative to domestic labor, κ, must increase to restore labor market clearing. This effect is cap-
tured by a counter‐clockwise rotation of locus LC in Figure 3, which makes an interior solution with 
intersection of OC and LC at c̄ < 1 and κ < 1 more likely. A higher offshoring fixed cost parameter 
makes offshoring less attractive ceteris paribus and therefore lowers the cutoff cost level character-
izing the firm that is indifferent between making and not making the investment of f. This effect is 
captured by a clockwise rotation of locus OC in Figure 3, which also makes the existence of an interior 
equilibrium more likely.
In an interior equilibrium as captured, for instance, by the intersection point of the solid OC and 
LC loci, an increase in either offshoring cost parameter lowers the cutoff cost level c̄ and thus the share 
of offshoring firms in our model. The consequences of higher offshoring costs on the effective wage 
differential κ depend, however, on which offshoring cost parameter changes. If the fixed offshoring 
cost parameter increases, the provoked fall in host country labor demand unambiguously lowers the 
effective wage differential κ. Whereas this labor demand effect is also present when the variable off-
shoring parameter increases, it is counteracted and dominated by the initial increase in τ, so that the 
effective wage differential increases.
3.4 | Offshoring margins and welfare
With the general equilibrium outcome at hand, we can look in more detail at the adjustments of off-
shoring along two margins that play a prominent role in the trade literature: the extensive margin, 
capturing changes in the mass of offshoring firms; and the intensive margin, capturing changes in 
the volume of offshoring by incumbent offshoring firms. Looking at the extensive margin first, we 
can note that the share of firms that can offshore is c specific and depends on the firm’s endogenous 
(9)w∗L∗ =R𝜎−1
𝜎
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decision on whether to make investment f or not. Denoting the share of offshoring firms in the total 
number of firms with the same marginal cost c by χ(c), we can compute 
according to Equation 6. It is easily confirmed that 𝜒 ′(c) < 0 holds for all c < c̄, implying that the share 
of offshoring firms decreases in c. The economy‐wide share of offshoring firms is then given by the fre-
quency‐weighted mean of χ(c) and amounts to 
where 𝜈 = 𝜈0 + 𝜈1 < 1. From Equation 12 we see that the share of offshoring firms, χ, increases in the cut-
off level of marginal costs c̄: d𝜒∕dc̄ = kc̄k−1(𝜈−𝜈1c̄) > 0. Since we know from Figure 3 that dc̄∕df < 0 
and dc̄∕d𝜏 < 0, we can thus conclude that a decline in either offshoring cost parameter increases the share 
of offshoring firms and thus raises offshoring along the extensive margin.
To study adjustments of offshoring along the intensive margin, we can note that total task expen-
ditures of offshoring firms are given by [(휎−1)∕휎]R[1−Rd∕R], with 
being the fraction of aggregate revenues accruing to nonoffshoring producers. In view of Equation 9, we 
can thus write the expenditure share of offshoring firms for imported tasks as follows 
(11)𝜒(c)=
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with lim휅→0 휌 = 1, lim휅→1 휌 = 1∕2, and dρ/dκ < 0. From this we can conclude that incumbent offshoring 
firms expand their expenditure share for imported tasks if the effective cost of employing foreign labor, κ, 
decreases. From Figure 3 we know that dκ/dτ > 0 and dκ/df < 0, and hence the response of offshoring to 
exogenous changes in the offshoring cost parameters along the intensive margin depends on the specific 
nature of the cost change. If the variable cost of offshoring decreases, the effective cost of foreign labor de-
creases despite an increase in the foreign labor demand and this triggers an expansion of offshoring along 
the intensive margin that complements the increase in offshoring along the extensive margin. If, however, 
the fixed cost of offshoring decreases, the effective cost of foreign labor increases owing to an increase in 
foreign labor demand, so that the increase in offshoring along the extensive margin is counteracted by a 
decline in offshoring along the intensive margin.
A distinction between the extensive and intensive margin of offshoring is important for under-
standing the welfare implications of offshoring in the source country.18  Since preferences are homo-
thetic, we can use the representative consumer in a normative interpretation and consider per‐capita 
labor income (=̂ GDP per capita) as our preferred welfare measure. In view of w = 1, we can thus 
express source country welfare as the inverse of the consumer price index: W = P−1. To determine 
the consumer price index, we can start from the observation that revenues are the product of prices 
and output. Therefore, accounting for Equation 1 and our previous insight that global consumption 
expenditure is equal to total source and host country labor income L + w∗L∗, revenues of the least 
productive firm can be expressed as 
A second expression for the revenues of the least productive producer can be found when combining the 
indifference condition of the marginal offshoring firm in Equation 5 with the offshoring indifference 
condition Γ1( ⋅ ) = 0: 
The two Equations 15 and 16 jointly determine price index P and thus source country welfare 
A decline in τ induces an expansion of offshoring along both the intensive and extensive margin and 
therefore raises foreign labor demand. Whereas this leads to higher foreign wages, the increase in the 
foreign wage rate is not strong enough to dominate the initial decline in the variable offshoring cost. As 
a consequence, the effective foreign labor cost decreases, reflecting an appreciation of domestic relative 
to foreign labor and thus an improvement in the source country’s (double) factorial terms of trade, with 
positive welfare consequences. Things are different if the fixed cost of offshoring decreases, because the 
expansion of offshoring along the extensive margin not only raises foreign wages but also the relative 
effective cost of employing workers in the host country. This induces a decline of offshoring along the 
intensive margin and worsens the (double) factorial terms of trade of the source country. The depreciation 
of domestic relative to foreign labor may be strong enough to dominate the source country’s direct welfare 
gain from a lower offshoring fixed cost. In the Online Appendix, we provide a formal discussion of these 
effects and illustrate the possibility of welfare losses for the source country from a lower fixed offshoring 
cost by means of a numerical example.19 
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Welfare in the source country and the relative importance of the extensive and the intensive margin 
of offshoring are the two main targets of the empirical analysis conducted in Section 4. There, we use 
the formal structure of our model as guidance for estimating the main parameters of this model and for 
analyzing the aptitude of our model to capture important features of the data. Furthermore, we shed 
light on how important acknowledging the observed overlap is for quantifying the welfare effects of 
offshoring and for assessing the relative importance of the two margins of offshoring.
4 |  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Based on the theoretical model outlined in the previous section, we now employ the German establish-
ment data to estimate four structural parameters, namely the common offshorability factor 휈0, meas-
uring the size independent probability of firms that some of their tasks are offshorable, the specific 
offshorability factor 휈1, measuring how the probability of conducting offshorable tasks is influenced 
by the task range, the elasticity of substitution between different product varieties σ, and the Pareto 
shape parameter k. In addition, we estimate two general equilibrium variables, namely the effective 
labor costs in the host relative to the source country of offshoring, κ, and the marginal cost of the firm 
that is indifferent between making and not making the offshoring investment, c̄. Since the six variables 
are treated parametrically by firms, we call them parameters in the subsequent analysis, while keeping 
in mind that κ and c̄ are endogenous in general equilibrium and reflect realizations of trade costs. The 
six parameters jointly determine the observables in our dataset, and hence we cannot estimate them 
independently using linear specifications, but instead have to solve a system of equations.
To make this problem tractable, we first pin down k and c̄ for all feasible realizations of 휈0 and 휈1 
by enforcing equivalence of the share of offshoring producers and the average marginal costs of non-
offshoring producers in the model with the data. Since marginal costs are not directly observable, we 
construct a proxy for them, relying on the available task information. To be more specific, in line with 
our theoretical model we compute marginal costs from the observed task range in the data, relying on 
the functional relationship in Equation 3. As outlined in the theory section, the marginal costs thus 
defined depend on the range of tasks conducted at home and abroad. Since we can determine the task 
range only for the workplaces in Germany, we have to confine the computation of marginal costs to 
nonoffshoring producers. We normalize marginal costs by dividing them by their maximum level. 
This ensures that in line with our theory the maximum of the now normalized marginal costs is equal 
to one. We then compute for nonoffshoring producers the marginal cost average. From a theory point 
of view, the thus computed marginal cost average depends negatively on the fraction of offshoring 
firms. To obtain two independent expressions for the fraction of offshoring producers and the aver-
age marginal costs, we therefore multiply the latter by the share of nonoffshoring producers, 1−χ. 
Accounting for Equations 6 and 12, we then obtain 
where a hat notation is used to indicate empirically observed (or estimated) variables and 휈 = 휈0 + 휈1 has 
been considered. The two equations in 18 determine k and c̄ as functions of the parameter tuple (휈0, 휈1) 
and the observed values of 휒̂  and ĉd
avg
. To further reduce complexity of our estimation problem, we nor-
malize revenues by dividing them by their economy‐wide mean and enforce equivalence of the average of 
normalized revenues of nonoffshoring firms in the model with its observed counterpart. From Equation 
13, we get 
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with rd
avg
≡ Rd∕[M(1−휒)] and ravg≡R∕M. Accounting for the solutions of k and c̄ from (18), we can then 
express σ as a function of the parameter tuple (휈0,휈1,휅). Following this approach reduces the estimation 
problem to one, in which we simultaneously estimate the three remaining parameters 휈0, 휈1, and κ, while 
recovering parameters c̄, k, and σ from structural relationships imposed by our model. This procedure has 
the additional advantage that our model captures first moments of important variables in the data.
4.1 | Estimation of 흂0, 흂1, and κ
We use a minimum distance method‐of‐moments (MM) estimator outlined in Ferguson (1958) and 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005). This estimator is similar to other MM applications and builds on the idea 
to specify a vector of nm observed population moments, m, which is linked to a vector of nx param-
eters of the model, x, according to m = μ(x), where μ(x) is a nm × 1 vector function. If the number of 
moments, nm, is larger than the number of parameters, nx, we can estimate the parameters x by mini-
mizing the weighted squared distance between observed moments m and computed moments μ(x), 
subject to a vector of constraints, Cons, that are imposed by the theoretical model: 
where W is a nm × nm positive‐semidefinite weighting matrix and a hat indicates observed or esti-
mated variables. The specific assumption of the MM estimator considered here is that m is a vector 
of reduced‐form parameters, whose estimates m̂ are the means of subsets of observations. As weight-
ing matrix W, we use a diagonal matrix based on the inverse variances of the observations used to 
construct the reduced‐form parameter estimates. This puts higher weight on more precisely measured 
moments and is the optimal weighting matrix for given reduced‐form estimates m̂ (cf. Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005).20 
We consider four moments in Equation 20. The first one is the variance of normalized revenues 
over all firms. Combining Equations 4, 6, and 7, we can compute 
Targeting this moment allows us to acknowledge in the empirical application a formal condition on the 
relative size of k and σ imposed by our model: k > 2(σ−1). If this condition were violated the variance of 
normalized revenues would go to infinity, and hence the minimum distance estimator would not select 
such a parameter constellation, irrespective of the considered weighting scheme.
With the remaining moments, we target the share of nonoffshoring producers over three decile 
intervals of the revenue distribution. To construct these intervals, we rank plants by their revenues and 
define groups that include the 10% fraction of producers with the highest revenues up to the respective 
decile. This gives ten disjoint intervals with increasing revenues. From the thus defined intervals, we 
select the interval 1 to acknowledge the observation that some offshorers have fairly low revenues and 
additionally choose intervals 5 and 9 to give also larger establishments a role in our estimation. To be 
more specific, choosing the first, fifth and ninth decile, we consider important information from the 
(19)�rdavg∕ravg=
1− c̄k−𝜎+1
(
𝜈−𝜈1c̄
k−𝜎+1
k−𝜎+2
)
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(
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k−𝜎+1
k−𝜎+2
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1−𝜒
,
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tails of the revenue distribution and information around the median observation. Thereby, we hope 
to capture key aspects of the revenue distribution, without using the full information of this distribu-
tion (as it is common, for instance, with maximum likelihood estimation).21  To compute these three 
moments in the model, we make use of Equation 6 and determine the marginal cost corresponding to 
quantiles, q = 1, 2, …, 10, in the revenue distribution according to cq = (1−q∕10)1∕k. With the mar-
ginal cost level at hand, we then compute the share of nonoffshoring producers up to a certain decile 
position, employing Equation 6 a second time: 
The share of nonoffshoring producers for the three targeted revenue intervals can then be computed ac-
cording to 10(shd
q
−shd
q−1
), and hence the theory values of the three remaining moments are given by 
휇2(휈0, 휈1, 휅) = 10(sh
d
1
−shd
0
), 휇3(휈0, 휈1, 휅) = 10(shd5−shd4), and 휇4(휈0, 휈1, 휅) = 10(shd9−shd8), 
respectively.
Finally, in order for the estimated parameters to satisfy further parameter restrictions of the model, 
we specify the vector of constraints Cons in problem (20) as follows: 
4.2 | Implementation of the estimation strategy
Since the moment conditions outlined above are highly nonlinear functions of the parameters of our 
model, we cannot solve the minimization problem (20) analytically. Therefore, we choose a numeri-
cal approach, consider a discrete parameter space with fine grid, and compute the theory moments for 
all possible combinations of 휈0, 휈1, κ, and the corresponding values of c̄, k, σ resulting from Equations 
18 and 19, which fulfill the parameter constraints. Equipped with these solutions, we then evaluate, 
which parameter combination minimizes our MM estimator. Since there are a few outliers in the 
revenue distribution and since we want to ensure that our results are not driven by these outliers, we 
drop the lowest and highest half percent of establishment observations in the revenue distribution and 
defer an analysis of the full sample to a robustness check in Section B4. Further details on how we 
implement our estimation procedure are given in the Online Appendix.
4.3 | Estimation results
Applying the MM estimator to our dataset gives the parameter values reported in Table 3, with boot-
strapped standard errors from 50 replications in parentheses. In the upper panel, we report estimation 
results from the original sample, whereas in the lower panel we report the results when applying the 
weighting scheme provided by the Research Data Centre of the Institute for Employment Research 
in Nuremberg. This weighting scheme allows one to adjust for the overrepresentation of larger plants 
(22)shdq =
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in the Establishment Panel, and hence using it is recommendable, when being interested in econ-
omy‐wide effects of offshoring. Therefore, the lower panel captures the estimates from our preferred 
specification.
The estimates of 휈0 differ between the unweighted and weighted data. As outlined above, larger 
establishments are overrepresented in the unweighted sample, and hence the share of offshoring pro-
ducers is upward biased. To be more specific, the share of offshoring producers falls by almost 50%, 
when using weighted instead of unweighted data. Because of this bias, we overestimate the propensity 
to offshore when considering the unweighted data. In contrast to 휈0, the other parameter estimates do 
not seem to be overly sensitive to data weighting. An estimate of 휈1 = 0 indicates that dependencies 
in the distributions of task range and the share of offshorable tasks are not supported by the data. The 
estimate of k is within the range of estimates of Pareto shape parameters reported by other studies (cf. 
Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion, & Ottaviano, 2011; Arkolakis, 2010; Egger, Egger, & Kreickemeier, 2013). 
The value of σ is slightly lower than the one structurally estimated by Egger et al. (2013), relying on 
firm‐level information for five European countries, but in the range of the parameter estimates re-
ported by Broda and Weinstein (2006). The high estimate of c̄ acknowledges that offshoring and non-
offshoring establishments coexist over wide ranges of the revenue distribution. The estimated values 
are, however, lower than one because we observe selection in the establishment data.
Regarding the effective wage differential between the host and the source country of offshoring, 
κ, reliable estimates are not easy to find in the literature, mainly because information on labor costs 
for a large sample of countries is not easy to find. However, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics pro-
vides data on hourly labor compensation costs in manufacturing industries for several economies.22  
Using information on bilateral trade from the OECD STAN Database, this allows us to construct a 
sample of 32 host countries of German offshoring, for which we have information on both the value 
T A B L E  3  Estimation results for the model with overlap
Parameter values Unweighted data 
흂
0
흂
1
κ k σ c̄
Estimates 0.213 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.255 (0.01) 4.068 (0.01) 2.928 (0.01) 0.9996 (0.00)
Targets m
1
m
2
m
3
m
4
Computed 12.597 (0.40) 0.997 (0.00) 0.942 (0.00) 0.427 (0.01)
Observed 10.379 (0.22) 0.952 (0.00) 0.883 (0.01) 0.569 (0.01)
Difference 2.218 (0.30) 0.044 (0.00) 0.059 (0.01) −0.143 (0.01)
Parameter values Weighted data
휈
0
휈
1
κ k σ c̄
Estimates 0.111 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.271 (0.01) 4.009 (0.00) 2.973 (0.03) 0.999 (0.00)
Targets m
1
m
2
m
3
m
4
Computed 36.822 (5.41) 0.999 (0.00) 0.977 (0.00) 0.777 (0.00)
Observed 43.870 (0.58) 0.972 (0.00) 0.926 (0.00) 0.815 (0.00)
Difference −7.048 (5.34) 0.027 (0.00) 0.051 (0.00) −0.038 (0.00)
Note: We consider the variance of normalized revenues over all firms (휇
1
) and the share of nonoffshoring producers in the first, fifth, 
and ninth decile of the revenue distribution (휇
2
,휇
3
,휇
4
, respectively) as four data moments to estimate parameters 휈
0
, 휈
1
, and κ by 
means of the minimum‐distance estimator in Equation 20. Furthermore, we retrieve parameters k, c̄, and σ from Equations 18 and 
19, which are used as constraints in our minimization problem. Estimations are based on 24,148 establishment observations from all 
industries. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) in parentheses. 
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of intermediate goods imports and the hourly labor compensation costs.23  We use this information to 
construct an intermediate‐goods import‐weighted measure of foreign labor compensation costs for the 
year 1999, which for non‐EMU members amounts to 66.96% of the labor compensation costs reported 
for Germany in this year. For the subsample of Eastern European countries and countries outside the 
OECD, which covers the low‐cost countries in the dataset, the respective value falls to 14.42%. Since 
offshoring in our model is low‐cost seeking, we therefore think that an estimated value for κ of 0.27 
is of reasonable magnitude.
To see how accounting for the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers affects our pa-
rameter estimates, we also apply the minimum distance estimator to a model variant, in which we 
impose the restriction 휈0 = 1 and 휈1 = 0. In this case, the probability of offshoring Prz(s > 0) equals 
one if a firm makes the offshoring investments f, and hence the model enforces an outcome without 
overlap. In all other respects, we keep the initial estimation approach. In particular, to make the pa-
rameter estimates directly comparable with those reported in Table 3, we consider the same moment 
conditions as in the model with overlap. The estimation results for the more restrictive model are 
reported in Table 4.
Contrasting the parameter estimates from Tables 3 and 4, we see that disregarding the overlap in 
the data by enforcing 휈0 = 1 and 휈1 = 0 leads to a considerably lower estimate of c̄ and a considerably 
higher estimate of κ. This is intuitive, because a model without overlap associates offshoring produc-
ers with high‐productivity plants, and hence a lower cost saving from offshoring is required ceteris 
paribus to make the producer with (a low) marginal cost c̄ indifferent between offshoring and nonoff-
shoring. Both models do a fairly good job in explaining the targeted data moments. Unsurprisingly, 
the model with overlap is more successful in explaining the share of nonoffshoring firms in the three 
revenue decile intervals, but is at the same time somewhat less successful in explaining the variance 
of normalized revenues in the data.
T A B L E  4  Estimation results for the model without overlap
Parameter values Unweighted data 
흂
0
흂
1
κ k σ c̄
Estimates 1.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.463 (0.03) 2.491(0.01) 2.196(0.01) 0.537(0.00)
Targets m
1
m
2
m
3
m
4
Computed 10.351 (0.22) 1.000 (0.00) 1.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Observed 10.379 (0.22) 0.952 (0.00) 0.883 (0.01) 0.569 (0.01)
Difference −0.028 (0.06) 0.048 (0.00) 0.117 (0.01) −0.569 (0.01)
Parameter values Weighted data 
휈
0
휈
1
κ k σ c̄
Estimates 1.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.796 (0.01) 3.035 (0.00) 2.506 (0.00) 0.484 (0.00)
Targets m
1
m
2
m
3
m
4
Computed 42.204 (1.02) 1.000 (0.00) 1.000 (0.00) 0.894 (0.00)
Observed 43.870 (0.58) 0.972 (0.00) 0.926 (0.00) 0.815 (0.00)
Difference −1.666 (0.92) 0.028 (0.00) 0.074 (0.00) 0.079 (0.00)
Note: We set 휈
0
= 1, 휈
1
= 0, and consider the variance of normalized revenues over all firms (휇
1
) and the share of nonoffshoring pro-
ducers in the first, fifth, and ninth decile of the revenue distribution (휇
2
,휇
3
,휇
4
, respectively) as four data moments to estimate param-
eter κ by means of the minimum‐distance estimator in Equation 20. Furthermore, we retrieve parameters k, c̄, and σ from Equations 18 
and 19, which are used as constraints in our minimization problem. Estimations are based on 24,148 establishment observations from 
all industries. Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) in parentheses. 
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4.4 | Model fit
To shed further light on how well the two models capture important features of the data, we contrast 
computed and observed values for the share of offshoring producers, normalized revenues, and nor-
malized marginal costs at the percentile level. Thereby, we focus on the parameter estimates for the 
weighted data, because these are the estimates we will use later to quantify economy‐wide effects of 
offshoring. Starting with the share of offshoring producers, we rank plants according to their posi-
tions in the revenue distribution, define percentile intervals (as the highest 1% fraction of plants with 
revenues up to the respective percentile), and average the share of offshoring producers over these 
intervals. We then plot observed against computed shares of offshoring producers for each percentile 
interval. The outcome is displayed in Panel A of Figure 4, where we use black dots for the model with 
overlap and gray diamonds for the model without overlap. The figure shows that, not surprisingly, 
accounting for the overlap improves the fit of our model with the share of offshoring producers data. 
However, even the model with overlap is not able to fully capture the strong variation in the share of 
offshoring producers over percentile intervals.
In a second goodness of fit analysis, we look at the aptitude of our model to capture the variation of 
normalized marginal costs. For this purpose, we rank producers by their marginal costs and compute 
the average of these costs (divided by their maximum level) over percentile intervals. Since marginal 
costs are computed from the observed task range in the data and since we can determine the task 
range only for the workplaces in Germany, we restrict the sample of establishments to nonoffshoring 
producers and plot for these plants observed against computed marginal cost averages. Again, we use 
black dots for the model with overlap and grey diamonds for the model without overlap and display 
the results in Panel B of Figure 4. The model overestimates the variation of marginal costs in the data, 
primarily because it tries to explain the relative larger variation of revenues with variation in marginal 
costs only. The observation that the model with overlap underestimates the normalized marginal costs 
at low percentiles more strongly may indicate that it is more successful in capturing the high revenues 
of the most productive producers in our dataset.
To see whether this conjecture can be confirmed, we analyze in a third step the aptitude of our 
model to capture the variation of revenues among nonoffshoring producers. For this purpose, we rank 
nonoffshoring producers by their revenues and group them in percentile intervals. We then display 
observed and computed averages of normalized revenues, that is, revenues divided by their economy‐
wide mean, in Panel A of Figure 5, using black dots and grey diamonds to distinguish the model with 
overlap from the model without overlap. We see that the model cannot fully explain the extensive 
F I G U R E  4  Model fit: overlap and normalized marginal costs. Panel A: Offshoring overlap; Panel B: Marginal 
costs. Note: •, Model with overlap; ⧫, Model without overlap
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variation of normalized revenues in the data and find support for our conjecture that the model with 
overlap is more successful in capturing the high revenues of the most productive establishments in 
the data.
In a final goodness of fit analysis, we repeat the previous analysis for the full sample of offshoring 
and nonoffshoring producers (black dots and gray diamonds) and for the sample of offshoring firms 
only (black stars and gray squares). We display the result in Panel B of Figure 5. The finding that the 
model with overlap does a better job in explaining the high revenues of the most productive producers 
and is therefore more successful in capturing the variation of normalized revenues in the data remains 
valid when considering all producers. The goodness of fit for the sample of offshoring firms refers to 
an out‐of‐sample prediction of our model, since the revenues of offshoring firms have not been used as 
moments in the parameter estimation. Overall, the out‐of‐sample prediction is not overly successful, 
but the main insight that the model with overlap is better suited for explaining the high revenues of the 
most productive producers is still valid.24 
4.5 | Welfare effects of offshoring
In a next step, we employ the parameter estimates from Tables 3 and 4 to quantify the welfare effects 
of offshoring in our model. Thereby, we focus on the weighted data in order to ensure that our results 
are not biased because of an overrepresentation of large establishments. Of course, the quantitative 
welfare effects presented here have to be interpreted with care, because the model outlined in Section 
3 is too stylized to give a realistic picture of such effects. Still, the analysis in this and the next section 
provide a useful illustration of how firm overlap shapes the welfare effects of offshoring in a model 
with heterogeneous firms.
Welfare under autarky (superscript a) can be inferred from Equation 17 by setting the two general 
equilibrium variables c̄ and κ at zero and one, respectively. According to Figure 3, this corresponds 
to the case of prohibitively high variable trade costs τ in our theoretical model. The welfare effects of 
offshoring can then be computed according to ΔW = 100 (W∕Wa−1): 
(23)ΔW =100
{(
1+
𝜅L∗
𝜏L
) 1
𝜎−1
[
1−
c̄k
𝜈−𝜈1c̄
(
𝜈(𝜎−1)
k−𝜎+1
−
𝜈1c̄(𝜎−2)
k−𝜎+2
)
f
fe
] 1
1−𝜎
−1
}
,
F I G U R E  5  Model fit: normalized revenues. Panel A: Nonoffshoring producers; Panel B: All producers and 
offshoring producers only. Note: • (★), Model with overlap; ⧫ (■), Model without overlap
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where ΔW can be interpreted as a change in GDP per capita relative to autarky. Combining Equations 5 
and 16, and Γ2(𝜅, c̄) = 0, we can solve for theory‐consistent values of f, fe, and 휏L∕L∗ as functions of the 
four structural parameters 휈0, 휈1, σ, k and the two general equilibrium variables κ and c̄ (reflecting the level 
of variable trade costs). Substituting the resulting expressions into Equation 24, we then obtain the welfare 
effects of offshoring as function of the parameter estimates in Table 3.
Following this approach, we estimate a GDP per capita stimulus from the observed exposure to 
offshoring that amounts to 20.71%, with standard error 0.21, when relying on the parameter estimates 
in Table 3. In contrast, the welfare gain drops to 10.93%, with standard error 0.19, when employing the 
parameter estimates from Table 4. Hence, the welfare estimates from offshoring are reduced by almost 
50% when disregarding the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring firms in the data. This sizable gap 
can be explained by the different κ‐estimates from the two models, which reflect a fundamental bias 
from ignoring the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers in quantitative trade models. 
Since the model without overlap associates offshoring with the most productive producers, it under-
estimates the (marginal) cost saving from offshoring, that is, it overestimates the true value of κ. With 
the gains from offshoring directly linked to its (marginal) cost saving effect, this leads to a downward 
bias in the welfare estimates, when disregarding the overlap in the data.25 
For an interpretation of the magnitudes of our welfare estimates, they can be put in perspective to 
estimates reported by other studies. An interesting point of departure in this respect is the multi‐coun-
try Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002), which has become a benchmark in the quanti-
tative trade literature. Eaton and Kortum compute the welfare effects of a country’s movement from its 
observed trade openness to autarky and therefore consider a comparative static experiment of similar 
magnitude as ours. For Germany, they report a welfare loss of only 1.3% from moving to a closed 
economy. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) use an Eaton and Kortum (2002)‐type model in a calibration 
exercise for 60 economies. They provide a recipe on how to use their setting for computing an upper 
bound of the welfare gain associated with a movement from autarky to free trade. For Germany, the 
upper bound of welfare gain is 19.6% of GDP in the overly optimistic case that all obstacles to trade 
are eliminated. As pointed out by Caliendo and Parro (2015) welfare estimates become significantly 
larger in quantitative trade models when accounting for intermediate goods. Costinot and Rodriguez‐
Clare (2014) analyze the role of intermediates systematically and show in an illustrative example that 
in the case of Germany, accounting for intermediates can lead to welfare estimates that are ten times 
higher than estimates from models, which do not account for intermediates. Our results indicate that 
estimates for welfare effects of offshoring can be increased as well when acknowledging the overlap 
of offshoring and nonoffshoring producers in the data.
4.6 | Offshoring at the turn of the millennium
To shed light on how German offshoring has evolved over the last 25 years, we use information 
from the OECD STAN and EBOPS databases and construct a comprehensive measure of offshoring, 
which accounts for the import of both goods and service inputs (see the Online Appendix for details). 
Dividing the resulting measure by GDP gives the German openness to offshoring, eoff, which has in-
creased from 7.01% in 1990 to 16.17% in 2013. We can now use our model to decompose this increase 
into changes at the intensive margin—capturing changes in the offshoring activity of incumbent off-
shoring firms; and the extensive margin—capturing changes in the mass of offshoring firms. To do 
so, we specify a theory‐consistent measure of offshoring openness eoff = 휅∕(휏L∕L∗) and compute for 
each year values of the exogenous effective relative domestic labor supply 휏L∕L∗ and the endogenous 
variables κ and c̄ that are consistent with the observed eoff and the two implicit general equilibrium 
relationships Γ1(c̄, 𝜅) = 0 and Γ2(𝜅, c̄) = 0.
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We conduct these computations for both the model with overlap and the model without overlap and 
use the thus determined parameter estimates to derive theory‐consistent values of offshoring openness 
for a counterfactual situation, in which the mass of offshoring firms stayed constant at the 1990 level. 
We present a detailed discussion on how we compute these variables and an overview of our param-
eter estimates in the Online Appendix and summarize the main insights from this decomposition 
exercise in Figure 6. The black line in this figure depicts the observed changes of German offshoring 
openness, whereas the solid and dashed gray lines capture the changes of offshoring that are attributed 
to the intensive margin by the models with and without overlap, respectively.
The figure shows an overall increase in German offshoring openness since the early 1990s. However, 
this increase has not been monotonic. There were ups and downs over the covered time span, with 
three notable dips in the early 1990s, the early 2000s and, most strongly, in 2009. Aside from a slight 
global decline in the trade to GDP ratio at the time, the first dip in offshoring openness captures two 
particularities of the German reunification. Eastern German producers were less inclined to offshore, 
and Western German producers gained access to cheap labor in the now larger domestic economy. The 
second dip picks up a general decline in the trade to GDP ratio in the aftermath of the dot‐com cri-
sis—maybe reinforced by a decline in the demand for cheap foreign labor after the drastic labor market 
reforms in Germany at the beginning of the new century. Finally, the dip of offshoring openness in 2009 
captures the well documented sharp decline in globalization during the financial crisis.
According to the model with overlap, both the extensive and intensive margin have played a prom-
inent role in explaining the evolution of German offshoring openness. The intensive margin contrib-
uted 38.23%, with standard error 0.61, to the overall increase in German offshoring openness over the 
period 1990 to 2013. The intensive margin seems much less important, however, if one relies on the 
model without overlap, explaining only 9.33%, with standard error 0.34, of the increase in German 
offshoring openness in this case. This difference is well in line with Armenter and Koren (2015), 
who calibrate a quantitative trade model along the lines of Melitz (2003) with sharp sorting of firms 
into export mode, using U.S. data, and compare it with an otherwise identical trade model that allows 
for overlap of exporters and non‐exporters. In a counterfactual exercise they show that lowering the 
iceberg trade cost parameter leads to substantial differences of the two models regarding the relative 
importance of the extensive and intensive margin for explaining the increase in exporting activity, 
with the extensive margin being more important in the model without overlap.
F I G U R E  6  Changes in German offshoring openness between 1990 and 2013. Note: — , observed; —, intensive 
margin (with overlap); ‐ ‐ ‐, intensive margin (without overlap)
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We complete the discussion in this section by simulating the gains from offshoring over the period 
1990 to 2013. The results of this exercise are depicted by Figure 7. In line with our insights from 
Section 4 the gains from offshoring are more pronounced when accounting for the observed overlap 
in the data. The welfare stimulus from the expansion of offshoring between 1990 and 2013 is 8.93%, 
with standard error 0.11, in the model with overlap and 7.86%, with standard error 0.08, in the model 
without overlap. To put the size of these effects into perspective, we can contrast the offshoring 
gains with the overall increase in German GDP per capita between 1990 and 2013, which amounts 
to 37.16%. According to our model, the exceptional increase in openness to offshoring after the fall 
of the Iron Curtain therefore explains almost one quarter of the overall increase in German GDP per 
capita according to our model.
Taking stock, the analysis in this section confirms our previous finding that ignoring the overlap 
leads to a downward bias in the welfare estimates of offshoring. Furthermore, the analysis shows that 
ignoring the overlap has the additional effect of exaggerating the contribution of the extensive margin 
to the observed increase of German offshoring openness since the early 1990s. Whereas we think that 
the differences of the two models regarding the decomposition of changes in offshoring into the ex-
tensive and intensive margin and the welfare effects associated with an observed change in Germany 
are informative about the importance of acknowledging firm overlap, given the stylized nature of our 
model one should not put too much emphasis on the specific level of the estimated effects.
5 |  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides evidence on selection of offshoring producers and their coexistence with nonoff-
shoring producers over wide ranges of the revenue distribution, using German establishment data. To 
capture these patterns, we make use of insights from probit regressions for identifying the main de-
terminants of offshoring and build a model, in which firms differ in the number of tasks they perform 
in the production process and the share of tasks they can offshore to a low‐cost host country. Specific 
realizations of these two technology parameters are the outcome of a lottery and marginal produc-
tion costs decline in the number of tasks performed and the share of tasks offshored. Offshoring is 
subject to fixed and variables costs, and not all producers find it attractive to make an investment into 
offshoring. This gives a model of heterogeneoues firms, in which some but not all firms of a certain 
F I G U R E  7  The welfare effects of offshoring between 1990 and 2013 Note: —, with overlap; ‐ ‐ ‐, without 
overlap.
   | 163CAPUAN et Al.
revenue category conduct offshoring with the share of offshoring producers increasing in revenues, 
as suggested by the data.
In an empirical exercise, we estimate key parameters of the model with a method of moments 
approach, employing the German establishment data. Based on the parameter estimates, we show 
that access to offshoring has increased welfare in Germany by 20.71%. This welfare estimate falls 
by almost 50% when disregarding the overlap in the data. The reason for this sizable gap is that a 
model without overlap associates offshoring with high‐productivity producers and thus with produc-
ers, which by assumption require just a small marginal cost saving for finding production shifting to 
a low‐cost country attractive. Furthermore, in a decomposition analysis we show that the increase in 
German offshoring over the period 1990 to 2013 is to a large extent explained by an increase along 
the intensive margin, that is, by an expansion of offshoring by incumbent offshoring producers. This 
differs from the decomposition in the model without overlap, where the extensive margin, that is, the 
increase in offshoring owing to an increase in the number of offshoring producers, is considerably 
exaggerated. We show that the two main insights of a downward bias in the welfare effects and the 
exaggeration of the extensive margin of offshoring when ignoring the overlap in the data are robust to 
changes in the estimation strategy and the inclusion of outliers.
Elaborating on two important biases that materialize when ignoring the overlap of offshoring and 
nonoffshoring firms in the data, we hope to provide a stimulus for future research on the quantita-
tive effects of offshoring. A promising avenue for extending the analysis in this paper is to allow for 
firms in the host country, which in the interest of tractability have been excluded in this paper. Such 
an extension would shed light on the crowding out of local production by foreign labor demand of 
offshoring firms and would provide a framework for a rigorous welfare analysis in the host country 
of offshoring. An analysis along these lines would thus be informative to what extent the welfare es-
timates in the host country are biased when ignoring the overlap in the data and thereby complement 
the analysis in this study.
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ENDNOTES
1 Becker et al. (2013) point out that in order to be offshorable, a task must be routine (cf. Levy & Murnane, 2004) and lack 
the necessity of face‐to‐face contact (cf. Blinder, 2006). In our sample, 30.25% of tasks are offshorable in the average 
German establishment according to this criterion. 
2 It is well established that allowing for firm heterogeneity in more than just one dimension helps making the Melitz (2003) 
model better suited for explaining firm‐level evidence in the context of trade. Prominent examples that provide extensions 
in this direction include Armenter and Koren (2015), Davis and Harrigan (2011), Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), 
Hallak and Sivadasan (2013), Harrigan and Reshef (2015), and Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2017). In this 
paper, we assume that heterogeneity is rooted in two characteristics of the task composition (their number and offshorabil-
ity) and assume, in line with Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Egger et al. (2015) and others, that task composition determines 
technology, which is exogenous to the firm. This differentiates our model from Bustos (2011) who studies endogenous 
technology choice in the context of trade. 
3 As pointed out by Baldwin 1955, p. 260): “The early classical writers refer to the terms on which a nation trades by com-
paring the number of units of productive services of a foreign country whose product exchanges for the product of one unit 
of the productive services of the home country. Being dominated by a real‐cost theory of domestic value (although assert-
ing its inapplicability in the international sector), it was only natural for the classical writers to express the terms of trade 
in this fashion.” Viner 1937, p. 561) has introduced the term “double factorial terms of trade” to refer to these factor‐based 
conditions of exchange. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) have adopted this criterion in a model featuring heterogeneous firms 
and external scale economies. 
4 Relying on relative effective labor costs when providing intuition for the welfare effects of offshoring acknowledges that 
trade involves the exchange of final against intermediate goods, so that changes in the relative price of exports and im-
ports do not reflect changes in the terms of trade of consumer goods. We show in the Online Appendix (for access, see 
Supporting Information at the end of the paper) that a worsening of the factorial terms of trade for the source country is 
instrumental for the existence of welfare losses from offshoring in the source country. 
5 We measure offshoring openness by the import of intermediate goods and services relative to GDP. 
6 As a nice side effect of our modeling approach, the two sources of heterogeneity in our model are rooted in the marginal 
costs of production, which then subsume heterogeneity of firms in all relevant performance measures. This feature allows 
us to use the toolbox of heterogeneous firms models along the lines of Melitz (2003) for our analysis and makes our 
analysis akin to Harrigan and Reshef (2015), who consider differences in total factor productivity and the factor shares 
of skilled and unskilled workers as exogenous sources of firm heterogeneity. Since our data does not show evidence that 
offshroable and non‐offshorable tasks differ in their skill composition, exogenous differences in factor shares appear to be 
a less important determinant for explaining the offshoring decisions of German producers. 
7 Rodriguez‐Lopez (2014) also studies the overlap of offshoring and nonoffshoring firms. He formulates a probabilistic 
model of offshoring and shows that the interaction of a selection effect and an escape‐competition effect produce a hump‐
shaped relationship between firm productivity and offshoring probability. To the extent that revenues are positively cor-
related with productivity, our data does not support a hump shape in this relationship. 
8 Please note that the data input is subject to data protection rules of the IAB. Therefore, not all data can be accessed through 
the authors. However, aggregated data as well as the program codes used are available from the authors upon request. 
9 Two remarks on the data input are in order. First, the IAB Establishment Panel provides plant‐level information, which 
cannot be aggregated to the firm level. Since we cannot distinguish between plants (establishments) and firms, we use 
the two terms interchangeably. Second, the Establishment Panel does not provide information on the country of origin of 
imported intermediates, and hence we associate imports from low‐income countries with those originating from non‐EMU 
countries, as these are the countries with lower per‐capita income on average. 
10 Our results do not change if we give answer sometimes a weight of 1. 
11 Using survey data from 2006 allows us to distinguish more tasks than in Spitz‐Oener (2006) and Becker et al. (2013). In 
particular, we can capture a set of IT tasks that are not covered by previous studies. To make sure that our classification 
of these new tasks into offshorable and nonoffshorable ones does not drive our results, we have also considered the 1999 
wave and the 19 tasks distinguished by Spitz‐Oener (2006) as well as both the 1999 and 2006 waves and the 16 tasks dis-
tinguished by Becker et al. (2013). These modifications have only little effect on the evidence reported in this section. 
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12 Whereas the variation in the task range and the share of offshorable tasks for the sample of establishments is sizable, dif-
ferences in the means of these variables between sectors are rather small. For instance, distinguishing eight broad sector 
categories, the mean of task range has a minimum level of 0.229 in transport and communication and a maximum of 0.280 
in services. 
13 Whereas Table 2 only reports robust standard errors, we have checked the significance of our estimates when clustering 
standard errors at the industry times region level. 
14 In the case of offshoring, the host country generates income from producing for firms in the source country and it uses the 
income from exporting the output of offshored production to finance the import of differentiated goods. 
15 One could alternatively assume that firms draw s together with z in the first‐stage lottery. Provided that s is not revealed 
prior to the investment of stage two, this would give the same formal structure as in our model. 
16 It is an important feature of our model that marginal costs are negatively related to the task range. Whereas we cannot 
observe marginal costs in our dataset, we can make use of Equation 4 to establish a positive link between task range and 
revenues. In line with this theoretical prediction, we find evidence for a positive link between the range of tasks and the 
level revenues in our data. 
17 The critical levels of τ and f depend—among other model parameters—on the levels of 휈
0
 and 휈
1
. In the knife‐edge case of 
휈
0
=0, a unique interior equilibrium is guaranteed for any combination of τ and f. 
18 Modeling the host country in a parsimonious way, our model lacks important features that make it suitable for studying 
host country welfare. Therefore, we focus on the source country of offshoring in our welfare analysis. 
19 Welfare losses in the source country do not go hand in hand with global welfare losses, because the host country benefits 
from higher labor demand. 
20 In a robustness analysis presented in Section B4 we analyze how our results change when relying on an estimate of the 
inverse variance–covariance matrix of moment conditions for constructing W, as it is common in GMM applications. 
21 Of course, it is possible to add additional deciles from the revenue distributions and we know from Newey and Windmeijer 
(2009) that using more moment conditions can improve efficiency, but at the same time can make inference less accurate. 
Ziliak (1997) provides an early discussion of this efficiency–bias tradeoff in the choice of the number of moment con-
ditions. In our application, the benefit from considering additional deciles of the revenue distributions as further sample 
moments should be fairly small if important features of the revenue distribution are already picked up by the first, fifth, and 
ninth decile. 
22 Labor compensation costs cover all payments made directly to the worker, social insurance expenditures, and labor‐related 
taxes (cf. http://www.bls.gov/fls/ichcc.pdf for further details). 
23 The country sample includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brasilia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estland, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
24 In the sample for offshoring firms, we can only report the first 94 percentiles of the revenue distribution if we limit log 
revenues to a value lower than 11. 
25 Using the unweighted establishment data, the share of offshoring producers is exaggerated and the welfare effects of 
offshoring therefore larger than in the our baseline scenario. In the model with overlap welfare effects would increase to 
39.11%, with standard error 1.65, whereas in the model without overlap welfare effects would amount to 31.34%, with 
standard error 2.06. Hence, a drastic decline in the welfare effects of offshoring from disregarding overlap is also present 
when using the unweighted data. 
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